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Tuition la of general interest for three reaeons. 
First, in times like the present, particularly those of the 
past few years, there has been much discussion as to the 
feasibility of charging the patrons of the eohoole tuition. 
Second, with the extending of the free public schools be­
yond the eighth grade, there has been some question if the 
high school should be included in the free publlo school 
system. Third, some states having the ealea tax with which 
to help eupport schools allot the money to high schools by 
paying the tuition of non-resident students.
With the decline of tax reoeipte due to tax delin­
quencies and laws reducing the amount that might be levied, 
it was seriously considered by many that tuition should be 
charged to enable the school to continue to render high 
class service. In some instances, the sohool Boards took 
the initiative and set tuition rates for their own resident 
etudents. In a few states, the legislatures passed laws en­
abling the School Boards to charge tuition. This charge 
was not for speoial courses or the like, but for the privi­
lege of attending school. School districts that did not, 
or could not, support schools fought the payment of tuition 
to other districts where the children of their district 
attended school.
Shile much of this was due to the fact that it was
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difficult or Impossible to pay, there was also an Ideal of 
the American school system at stake* The question was, how 
free was the free public school system of America!
With the high school, some have felt that tuition 
could be charged as it was not included in the range of 
free public schools. Where the state legislature has set 
the amount of tuition that should be paid, there was con­
flict with the schools that maintained a higher standard 
than the average. This, of course, led to a demand for the 
patrons to pay the difference. Such a demand was naturally 
contrary to the principles of free public education.
Reeldene© is of importance for the reason that where 
tuition Is charged, it is based upon residence. In general, 
it may toe said that the free public schools are free only 
for those who reside in the district. The main object, then, 
is to establish the principles that determine residence.
Purpose
The purpose of this study will be to examine the 
Supreme Court cases of the different states that deal with 
residence and tuition. The principles established by these 
cases will be set up and illustrated by court cases.
The purpose of this study has five aspects, namely;
(1) To examine the court cases to determine the status of 
residence of parents. (3) To examine the court oases to 
determine the residence of homeless children. (3) To ex­
amine the court cnees to determine the payment of tuition
toy resident students. (4) to ermine the court oases to 
determine the payment of tuition toy non-resident students, 
(5) To examine Idle constitutionality of tuition laws.
Statement of the Problem
The Superintendent, the Principal, and the school Beard 
must know the principles that establish a student as a resi­
dent cr non-resident. They must know when tuition can toe 
charged, from whom collected, end how much may to© charged.
The problem of this study is focused upon setting up 
the principles that the Supreme Courts of the various states 
have established to these ends*
Sources of Bata
The material for this thesis was obtained by going 
to the descriptive word dictionary and finding the division 
and key to look for. Then the Corpus Juris was examined to 
form a basis for the study. The Century Digest end the 
second and third Decennial Digests were examined for cases 
pertaining to the subject and listed. In addition to this, 
the Current Digests up to 1935 were examined for the same 
purpose. This list of cases was then read in the various 
sectional court reports and briefed and filed.
Delimitations
This study is limited to the study of State Supreme 
Court oases dealing with residence and tuition. So study 
of the State Statutes will be made. Sc attempt will be made 
to establish the law on residence and tuition. The study
Hill be limited to » report of the findings of the different 
State Supreme Court® on residence and tuition.
Method of Study
First, a list of oases m e  compiled from the source® 
listed above {Sources of Data). These oases were then read 
and briefed from the various sectional court reports. The 
briefs were then grouped and arranged according to the prin­




RKSIBSKQI FOR SCHOOL PURPOSES
. the public schools of a state 
are, in general, open to children, otherwise eligible, who 
are bona fide residents, the test for this proof of resi­
dence should be ordinary indicia of residence or absence.
It may be assumed, with evidence not to the contrary, that 
the baste for residence has been made in good faith. Spec­
ulation as to the secret mental intentions of persons shall 
not enter into the evidence. In other words, the inten­
tions ae stated by witnesses without direct evidence to the 
contrary shall be as given.
Residence for school purposes in based primarily up­
on the purpose that person has for being in the district,
A person moving into a district for the purpose of taking 
advantage of the schools of the district will be held to be 
a non-resident. A person in the district for the purpose 
of having a home is a resident. Parente moving to a dis­
trict to work end make their domicile there are residents, 
»%ch case must rest upon th© merits of the care.1
Seeldence of.State Officials. Residence for school 
purposes does not have to be a legal domicile, that is, 
th© test for residence for school purposes is not the earns 
as for suffrage, in fact, it is possible to vote ore place
iQrosland v7 School District No.40 (1904) 91 Minne­sota 266, 97 K. W. 885.
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and have school residence in another.’ The governor and 
superintendent of public instruction in Uebraska lived in 
the state eapitol, Lincoln* during the term* of their of­
fice. Their legal voting residence was elsewhere in the 
state. They applied for admittance to tha Lincoln city 
schools for their children cs resident students. The Board 
of Education held that they wore non-resident students.
Thera was no doubt that the relation between the parents 
and children was parental and permanent. The famine* had 
not moved to Lincoln for the purpose of taking advantage 
of the educational facilities, that was evident. Tt was 
held by the Board of Education that the legal residence of 
the families being elsewhere, they could not gain residence 
in Lincoln for school purposes. The court held that *a 
family having legal custody and control of children end 
move for purposes other than for school privileges, the ohil-
' -v,/4‘dren are entitled to free tuition even though their legal 
residence is elsewhere.1*
**,£g.?&sX££}\$&. In Changing domiciles
and establishing a new domicile, two things art indispens­
able .3 First, a residence in a new location, and second, 
the intention to stay there. To change residence and to 
reside at this? residence over a period of a year or even 
more would not in itself constitute n change of residence.
%ick©y v. Selleck (1906) 76 Beb., 747, 107 H. W. 1033.
. fOardaer v. Board of Education of City of Fargo,(I860) 8 Oak., 259, 38 H. W. 933.
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The intent m m %  be, m  far a© the parties know, to st&y at 
the new residence ana not have plana os: knowledge of a fur­
ther change, The fact that the stay in the new residence 
would be long enough to establish a voting residence would 
not in itself establish a residence for school purposes.
Mr, Gardner,4 & farmer, moved to Fargo ©very winter 
with his family, hart of his household goods were taken 
along and the family lived in a rented house, A man was 
hired to take care of the farm. The issue was to determine
which place was the true domicile or home, the house in 
the city or the farm. It w m  held that #the more, tangible 
domiciliary acts have the greater weight la determining 
the true domicile»w In this case, It was decided that the
far® was considered the home and that Gardner was a non­
resident.
M £ L M ^ f e -la...££qgxal T e r r i f y . A federal official 
is, on the other hand, not & resident of any district, 
being a federal employee and living in federal territory, 
he is not a resident of any school district. The point In 
law that he hag not moved for the purpose of taking advan­
tage of any educational facilities has no bearing on the 
case.. The rules governing the validity of a residence fox 
school purposes in this case 'have no standing. It is im­
possible to set up a school residence while living in fed-
4Ibid.
8
eral territory, even though the school district surrounds 
the territory. A federal territory 1b under the direct su­
pervision of the federal government and the states are r5th- 
out authority. The schools c-f r state are set np toy the 
etrte authorlty for the resident* of that state of echool 
age. However, a federal employs* does not lose residence 
by > -oving to » federal ter'ltory. For instance, he nay con­
tinue to vote in hie former legal residence. Therefore, 
if ho has had legal residence in the state in which the 
federal territory is located, he c m  claim free tuition.5 
Otherwise, M s  children m e t  pay tuition.
Generally sneak­
ing, children whose parents are not residents of a school 
district are not permitted to attend school in that dis­
trict. When they are permitted to attend, it is by per­
missive state legislation. Children placed temporarily 
with relatives in one school district and with a father liv­
ing in another school district are held legal residents of 
the district their father resides in.® The test for resi­
dency failed on two points* First, the relation between the 
ohildren and the relatives was not parental and permanent, 
second, they were placed with the relatives to take advan­
tage of the educational facilities afforded.
A esse much the earn© but with a different angle was
^Rockwell v. Independent "SiSho'oF'Kistrict of Rapid 
City, (1935) 48 9. D. 137
®Fangman v. Mayers (1931) 8 p. (3nd) 783.
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that of B o r d e w y k B o r d e r }  b:, r resident of a school district 
r.oved awry f row the dirt riot during the rchool year. Upon 
leaving, he placed tv child under the care of M o  brother, 
giving hin full charge. Tix evidence had to chow that the 
uivclo wr,B * on loco parentis’' or the father would have to 
pay tuition, The evidence had to be accepted or prorented 
e.r there could be no speculation as to the secret mental 
Intentions of the father. It could not be hold that the 
girl had been brought to the district for educational ad­
vantage a ar she had been a resident, for school purposes,
A child who has had school residence In a district 
may be placed with a feuvlly in that district for the sole 
purpose of having a hoi e with derivable Influences,
Where parents are divoroed or separated, the chil­
dren can be left in the district where the parents had es­tablished residence.8 In this case, the parents were
separated and both moved away from the district. One of 
them continued to support the child in the old school 
district and it was held that the child was still a resi­
dent. The guardianship, of course, had to be parental and 
permanent,
(1) The teat for proof of residence should be ordi­
nary indicia of residence or absence thereof.
Summary of Points in Law in Chapter 3
(1932) 
66 JP. 1 l Reno Board of Education v. Hobbs, SO ®. K. 293
ipen'Hesi 'SoViCo'l disTrici '"§©• v. Bordewyk
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(3) Arrimgenents for the care of children must 1)0 
judged by the vlmini fact*, not by the possible secret 
mental Intentions.
(?) TftTmr.n way not become rooldentr ltpon moving to 
r dlntrlct for merely eduootlcvinl adVRutspeo.
(4) Each care must b© determined by It© merits.
(5) Residence for school purposes does not have to 
be a logoi domicile,
(6) Guardirnrhip to be valid eat«t be permanent and 
parental.
(7) To ofrr.nr® domiciles tro points are necessary} 
First, residence in * near location. Second, the intention 
to stay there.
(8) The more tangible domioilirry cote have the 
greater value in determining the true domicile.
(9) Domicile in ft federal territory does not es­
tablish residence for school purposes.
(10) State employees moving for other purpose® than 
for educational facilities cr«n establish residence for 
school purposes.
(11) Children, have school residence in r. district 




RESIDENCE OF HOMELESS CHILDREN
Homeless children are not necessarily orphan®. By 
homeless children I® meant those whose domiciles are not 
with their parents. This does not indicate that both of 
the parents are necessary to maintain the home. Either par­
ent may maintain and keep the home. In fact, residence for 
school purposes ©an be maintained in one district and resi­
dence in another district. Children deprived of a home 
with their parents are entitled to a free education as well 
as those living with parents. The homeless children are a 
responsibility of the state just as much as those in their 
own established homes. The purpose of the state in educa­
tion is to furnish a free education to all resident chil­
dren of the state. It Is evident, then, that homeless chil­
dren that can establish residence are just as entitled to a 
free education as other resident children. The purpose of 
this chapter shall be to show how such residence has been 
established. In no case was it found that homeless chil­
dren were held to be without residence. The residence was 
not necessarily in the district where the children were, 
but residence was established some place and some one was 
made responsible for their education.
As in all cases of residence, each caee had to stand 
on its own merits. In general, it might be said that those 
children of school age, not confined to an institution of
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correction, normal In other respects, eligible under the 
state laws as to age, etc., and able to establish residence, 
were entitled to a ftee education. The possible exception 
were those oruhane placed in homes that included in their 
purpose the education of the children in the home. This 
was especially true where money was provided for that pur­
pose. The length of the residence In the district was 
found to have no bearing on the case; the residence did not 
have to be continuous, such a® during vacations. If the 
residence was established in good faith and not with the 
purpose only of securing an education in the district, the 
guardianship permanent and parental, the residence was 
valid, In short, each case mist be determined on its merits.
Pi the q.Me. ?he legislature
of no state has tried to set up a rigid standard of rules to 
determine residence. The laws to be followed are general 
principles established for the purpose of guidance. The 
angles of each case are different on some detail®. While 
they can be, and are, the same in general, no fast and hard 
rule can be followed entirely. To do so would many times 
cause an injustice to be worked. The general principles 
must be set up and each case decided on its own merit®. For 
example, the law may read that upon moving to a district the 
father must work there to establish residence. It is en­
tirely possible that upon arrival the job may not be had for 
a number of reasons. According to a strict interpretation
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of the Till 0 , the father would not be able to establish resi­
dence. Basing the case on its merits, the point that would 
count would of the father upon moving to
the district. While we have drawn the example from a case 
of a child with a father, the principle is the same for all 
cases. Another point in determining a esse on its merits 
is that the evidence should be accepted as oreseated with 
no evidence to the contrary. That is, the witnesses may be 
assumed to be telling the truth when giving evidence.
There should be no speculation as to their secret mental in­
tentions.
■ Evidence of witnesses may
be taken at its face value unless there is evidence to the
contrary. When a witness ssys that a child has been placed 
with him and that he is to have full control over the child
and to continue to have it, it may be assumed that is Just 
the purpose the child ha® been placed with him. If it is 
maintained toy a parent that he can no longer support a 
child and that the child has been placed with a family to
provide a home, it must be accepted that that was the
reason for placing the child there. The fact that the child
is placed in the school, that the school is better than his
former residence, cannot be interpreted to mean that the 
secret reason for the change was to take advantage of edu­
cational facilities, and in so doing escape paying tuition. 
The guardianship is parental and permanent if that is the
14
stated fact in the case.
15 K 1 \ . ^ere homeless 
children are placed In either homes or institutions it must 
be shown thet the relation® are permanent end parental. By 
permanent» not any set time is meant. The time may be for 
a month, a year or more. The point is that a certain time 
limit is not set. If the control is only while actually 
staying at the place, such as during the school year or un­
til a certain age is reached, the control is not considered 
permanent. The parental relation must be the same as that
of a parent. The guardianship must mean that they are re­
sponsible for the well being of the child, that they must be 
willing tofeed, clothe and educate the child. To establish 
this point, the support need not necessarily be one hundred 
per cent,
A Hew York oaee* in 1908 establishes these point®.
An orphan boy by the name of Wisebauer was placed in a pri­
vate hone by a children* s aid aooiety of Brooklyn. This 
society paid a regular sum to the family for hi® board and 
also an additional sura for hie clothing. The boy was treat­
ed 3uat as a member of the family. Ho arrangements were 
made as to how long he was to stay with the family. When 
the boy wished to attend school the School Board refused 
him free tuition a® they held that he was not a resident of
1 People v. ex re1 Brooklyn dbitdrens* Aid Society (1908) 109 HYS 403.
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the society’s district.
The court held that the boy m w  as much & member of 
the Place family as he could be of any family. Mrs. Place 
stood in parental relation to the boy. $h© had complete 
control over him at all times. The boy had not been placed 
in the Place family for the sol® purpose of getting an edu­
cation but for the purpose of haring a home. The residence
of Mrs. Place was not questioned. Her relation to the boy 
was permanent and parental. Therefore* the boy was entitled 
to free tuition. The fact remains, however, that guardian­
ship is not always permanent and parental, but may be penal 
and temporary,
.Ifeiiiaaiftca. »  Incorrigibles com­
mitted to guardianship of a person does not quality them 
for residency in a school district. In the case of Black 
v. Graham^, an Incorrigible boy was comitted to the guard­
ianship of a resident of a school district in Pennsylvania,
The guardian wished to send him to the school in the dis­
trict but the School Board denied the boy admission on the 
grounds that he was not a resident. The guardian held that as 
he, the guardian, had residence, end the boy being under hie 
care and control, residence was established. The court 
ruled, in this case, that the relation between the boy and 
his guardian was penal and temporary, not permanent and 
parental. The purpose in this case was not to merely give
3Black v . Graham7 238 ha. 3*1,' 86 A,. 268.
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the boy an education but also to help him In other respects 
m  well. This fact, although true, did not make the re­
lationship permanent end parental which wan necessary to ee- 
tabl I eh re 3id.en.c0 .
In order to establish residence, it is not neoeesery 
to have a guardian at all. Children that have been emanci­
pated nay establish their own residence if they ar© of 
school age and otherwise eligible.
• By emancipation
is meant those children who are free of any parental con­
trol, making their own living, and are looking out for their 
own interests successfully. It la evident that children 
capable of talcing car© of themoelvee, should be given an op­
portunity for an education. As they h?,ve no one to establish 
their residence for them, it is necessary for them to estab­
lish It thcnselvee. That they may do this has been estab­
lished by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin.
In the case of J E ^ a l a l » 
a boy living in Wisconsin, living by himself, va® denied 
fro© admission to the public schools of the city he was liv­
ing in on the gonads that he w h s not a resident. The boy 
had no relatives in the district. So institution of any kind 
contributed to his support. The boy worked and paid for hie 
board and room in the district. The court held that a child 
emancipated and earning hie own living was © resident of the 3
3Xidd v. Joint 3chool District Hoi. 3, 144 fisc. 35,316 IfW 499.
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district and therefore entitled to attend the public aohools 
without the payment of tuition,
attsAsfcm*.. J i L j a i a a u j J j a a s a .»
school districts are charged by the state by law to provide 
free aohoole tor all residents of school age residing in the 
district. The question then whether or not the children in
charitable institutions are entitled to a free education
would be determined on the point of the children having resi­
dence for school purpose*? in the school district.
Generally speaking, the institution is the residence 
of the children living in them. They have no other home or 
place of domicile. The institution stands in parental rela­
tion to the children in the institution. This being; the 
case, the children In such homes are entitled to a free edu­
cation from the schools of that district, that is, the dis­
trict In which the home is located. Following the same
reasoning in the parental relationship the education is free 
only in the resident district. The institution cannot send 
its children to & school outside of the home district and ex­
pect a free education.
The fact that an institution does not pay taxes has no 
bearing on the oase of residency. In fact, very few homes of 
this type do pay taxes. The faot that the attendance of the 
children of the home might work a hardship on the local dis­
trict has no bearing on the oase. It can easily be seen 
that the attendance of a large number of pupils from a home
18
could crowd a school "beyond It® capacity and prove to be a 
drain on the finance® of the district. In Michigan, this Is 
guarded against. There, the superintendent of public in­
struction has the power to limit the number.4 The law on 
the residency would be the m ,  however.
Residency in Hones Sstsblleled fo-T the Fur*-os? of 
Education. Some Institutions arc formed for the purpose of 
oaring, supporting and educating homeless children. Us­
ually in ouch cause, money is provided for that purpose.
It was found in Mississippi that children in such institu­
tions were non-residents for educational purposes and that 
the home would have to pay the tuition to the local school
or provide its own educational facilities.
5A home in Mississippi was founded for the ourpose 
to support, care and educate homeless boys* Two boys from 
this home of school age were sent to the public school In 
the district where the home was located. The boys were re­
fused admittance on the grounds that they were non-residents 
of the school district* also that the home did not pay 
tares and so were not members of the district. The court 
held that the boys were non-residents of the district for 
school purposes. The school had been founded partly for 
the*purpose of educating its inmates. The children had not
40hlld Welfare Society of™ Flint v V Kennedy School District (1933) 230 Mich. 290, 189 N . W. 1003.
^^ake Farm v. District Board of Education, District No, 3 (1914) 179 Mies. 171 148 K. f. 115.
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been brought in for the sole purpose of having a homo, but 
for education ae well. Money had been provided for thrt 
purpose and they wore wait able to -'ey for ar education.
■>?n if they would have been without funds, their children 
would have been non-realdenta. The fact that the institu­
tion paid not tares had no bearing on the case.
In the Supreme Oourt oaoeo examined, it was found that the 
courts baned their decisions on residents for school pur­
poses upon the same general principle# that were used to 
determine the residence for school purposes of children w1.th 
parent®, Ufoen a child is pieced in n charitable Institution 
It Is assumed that they have no other residence or domicile. 
Children In such Institutions are under the control and care 
of the institution and usually the time that they will be 
there is indefinite. Tinder ordinary conditions, the chil­
dren remain in ouch homeo until they can oara for then- 
selves or until the responsibility is shifted to cone other 
person or persona. The very sene conditions aay he said to 
exist in a home with parents. It in not expected that the 
children in a home are going to stay there Indefinitely.
'Sven though they should, the responsibility of the school, 
district Is limited. When children reach a certain age, 
whether In a home or an Institution, the district is 
charged with providing a free education only up to a certain 
point. With these points established, the residence of
20
children for school purposes is established the same way, 
on the saute points* whether in homes, with their parents, 
or in charitable ho«tes, with the exceptions etated earlier*
Two Supreme Court oases from the states of Illinois 
and lost Virginia, illustrate the points in mind. Both
oases are recent ones and undoubtedly would be followed by 
court decisions in other states.
In the case of the M  . * *#*•
for children made a contract with a local school district 
to pay a part of the cost of sending its children to the 
local school. They agreed to continue to pay this sum even 
if the home was taken into the school district upon the vote 
of the people. The people did later vote to take the home 
into the district, whereupon the Grand Lodge decided to dis­
continue the payment of the tuition.
The Board held that the Lodge was liable on two 
counts, first, the contract with the Lodge, and second, the 
fact that the children of the home were non-residents. The 
last point was based upon the assumption that the children 
were in the home temporarily and so were not residents.
On the first count, the court held that the contract 
m s  void, as residents did not have to pay tuition. The 
fact that the children were not in the home for any set time
St„?koi $  W a t ) W W a ? *
8, 110 8S 440.
did not aaJce them non-reel dents. They were residents on 
the following point*: the relation bett^een the home and the 
children was permanent and parental, and the children had 
not been brought into the district merely for educational 
purposes, but to provide a home for them.
The Illinois o r b ©7 , a teacher of n Oovrnty eohoel was 
instructed by her Board to refuse admittance to orphans 
from an orphanage in the County without the payment of 
tuition. The refusal tree made because they held the orphans 
to be without residence. The Court held to the asms line 
of reasoning as the one in west Virginia, namely, the chil­
dren had not been brought into the district for the purpose 
of eduoatlon, and the home was the only residence that the 
children had. In 1916, the Supreme Court of Illinois gave 
a similar decision in the case of Ashley v...JBoard .cl^auc&- 
UflR .OfilfiLfflfi .IlUa JfflLJLMJa ja- Wtfc these h o  cases 
following each other, the point In law In the State of Illi­
nois was well established.
The mere presence or residence in a charitable home 
does not necessarily establish residency in that district.
If they are placed there by another district end supported 
by that district, they are held to be residents of the sup­
porting district,
ESTESES,, In .Qfr^t3i&fcJgmB« Persons, because they
7hogoon v Jones (1934) 311 111. 425, 143 HE 66.
84419
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are paupers, must be supported from means other than their 
c m .  Paupers of eohool age from a home dletrlot mist be 
supported end furnished a free education by that district. 
Paupers from another district are the liabilities of that 
district. In the case of the Sheldon Voqx JIoawr y.̂  . T o m  _of 
ii-jheldon8 . the paupers of a district including; those of a 
school age were placed in the poor house of Sheldon, The 
Poor House sent those of school age to the city schools 
where they were denied admittance. The Court held that 
they were residents of the district that supported then 
«<nd charged that dletrlot with the responsibility of edu­
cating then.
JA&s&mA . . i y ^ O ^ a d A f t g i f l f t a • Hones for 
neglected of delinquent children, but not licensed by the 
state, as such, do not have the arme standing as orphan-* 
ages so licensed, flnoh hones are usually privately run 
and are not financed by public money. In such homes, the 
children are not entitled to free tuition, while those in 
licensed homes are, They may be in a district for the same 
reason as children in licensed homes, but the dletrlot is 
not liable for their education.
The same is true of children pineed in boarding homes. 
Here * the educational. angle can plainly enter in. The 
boarding homes are very likely to be placed in such places
s3heldon Poor House vT Town of Sheldon (1900) 73 Vt. 130, 47 A 543.
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to take advantage of good educational facilities. Those who 
con afford such service for their children are apt to hear 
in mind the educational advantages of a hose In choosing one.
The charitable hones that have been dealt with have 
been of the licensed type. A case Illustrating the turns 
without a license Is that of the
r JXn!i,yti i Wt.*' 1** this case, a homo
was organinert to care for delinquent or neglected children, 
but was not entitled to a license, When the children from 
this home were sent to the school, they were refused admit­
tance because of non~revidence. In this esse, the Oourt 
ruled that the children in a licensed how® were residents 
of the district in which the home was located and so were 
entitled to free tuition. Those in turn-licenced homes were 
not residents of the district, as such bomm were in real­
ity boarding homes. The relationship was not permanent and 
parental. In view of such facts, the children of non-li- 
ceneed home® are not entitled to free tuition.
The boarding house angle is explained by the cage of 
itenefftUfl..Ba&r.d.jaf-£dno7.tlon..v^ atate Board of .Sduc,ptlan,AP 
Hies Lillian Bnysdorf lived in Kies Towner’s boarding 
house and expected to continue to live there. Her father 
lived in Hew York and supported her. Lillian applied for
®Child Welfare ™Soelety of Flint v 7~Kennedy School 
District (1932) 230 Mich. 390, 189 NW 1002.
10.. Manafelld Board of Education v. State Beard of Ed­ucation. C1925) 101 *. J. 474 139 A 765.
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admission in the Hackett town school, the tuition to be paid 
by the Mansfelld district where Kiss Towner was a qualified 
resident, The court ruled that Lillian was not a resident, 
ae she had been brought in by a non-resident for advantagee 
of education. The relationship between Miss Towner and Lil­
lian was not permanent or parental. The father continued 
to have control and could remove the girl at any time. He 
had also chosen the home with an education for his daughter 
in mind. The last fact disqualified her on the grounds that 
she had been brought in for educational purposes.
The residence of children not living with either parent or 
in any charitable Institution, or supported by their par­
ents, has been well established. The Supreme Courts of 
Missouri, Kentucky, Illinois, Sew York, and Iowa, covering 
a period of time from 1903 to 1933 have all handed down 
decisions in harmony with each other. The oases were based 
on the same points in law as were other oases on residence. 
That is, the oases were considered upon the individual 
merits of each ease. It was assumed that the witnesses 
were not hiding any secret mental intentions. The actual 
appearance of the case, suoh as living with a relative, and 
to all appearances a member of the family, plus the testi­
mony counted heavily. The purpose of these oases was to 
prove residence in the families of the persons with whom 
children were living.
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The Missouri courts have held that where It le the 
policy of the state to furnish free public schools for all 
children of school age the statutes relating to schools 
should be liberally construed.11 In this case of Halbert 
v* Olymer, the father of the child made an oral agreement 
with hie own father to let him have the grandchild and care 
for him. At times, the child would visit his father for a 
short time. Also, he would visit different places in the 
country such as any child with the opportunity might do.
The father contributed nothing to the support of his son, 
the grandfather assuming all care. In deciding that the 
boy wae a resident, the court ruled that for all purposes, 
the boy was a member of the grandfather*e family. As hie 
grandfather’s residence wae not questioned, the boy’s resi­
dence was established. The Court held that the State 
Statutes being liberally constructed, the boy was for all 
praetieal purposes a resident of the district, although his 
domicil© might still be with his father. It has already 
been pointed out in Chapter Tiro that it is possible to have 
a residence for school purposes, even though the domicile 
is elsewhere.
The tame point on realdenoe is also illustrated by
19the Stanford School District v. Powell. Here, the mother
^State @x rel Halbert v. Clyraer (1913) 164 Mo. App 
671, 147 3W 1119.
^Stanford School District v. Powell (1911) 145 K y . 
95, 140 SW 67.
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of a fir® year old girl died. Her father was a day laborer 
and wae unable to support or provide a home for her. Thie 
being the case, he gave her up to his sister, who promised 
to care and provide for the girl. When old enough, the 
girl applied for admittance to the public school but was 
denied admittance as a non-resident, the court held that 
the girl*« home was with her aunt and so was entitled to the 
school privileges of the district in which her aunt was a 
resident.
Both of these cases also contain the point that they 
did ;\ot live in the district merely for the purpose of at­
tending school but made their homes there.13 Both oases 
have the point of the xfilatlonahlp. being permanent and 
parental.14 The eligibility of a child for the privileges 
of a school district is not restricted to the domicile of 
the parent, but the actual residence of the child. A 
Worth Dakota case bring® thie point out clearly.15 A 
mother deserted by her husband placed her daughter with a 
sister. The mother moved out of the state to South Dakota 
and lived and worked there. The doubter remained with her 
aunt. During vacations aha often went to her grandmother* s 
where she would work, but always returned to her aunt.
The Worth Dakota statute® state “that schools of
13Or«nd Lodge v. Board of Education of Elkins (1933) 90 ft. V© 8
p e o p l e  v. Hendrickson (1908) 109 WTS 403.
15Andereon v. Breithe&rth (1933) 345 BW 483
the state shall at all times he equally free, open and 
accessible to all children over sir and under twenty-one 
years of age, residing in the district*. The court held 
that the residence of the child is not restrioted to the 
domicile of the parent hut in e broader sense, means the 
actual residence of the child.
When a child is taken into a home to he oared for in 
good faith, the right to attend public school does not de­
pend upon the legal residence of the child, hut whether or 
not they are a resident of the district in which they wish 
to attend school.13
The eon of William Saxe resided outside the bound­
aries of School District Bo. 36. His con stayed with hie 
grandmother, who lived in District Bo. 36. The grandmother 
was to oare for him and educate him at her own expense.
The father evidently was able to support the boy. It was 
held by the Board the arrangement was made merely to avoid 
payment of tuition. The court held that the arrangement 
was made in good faith, in which case the residency of the 
boy was established in District Bo. 36. The point that 
the secret mental intentions should not be considered was 
used in this case.
Temporary residence in a




school district is not sufficient to establish residence for 
school purposes. The reeidenoe is considered temporary even 
though the stay is of some length. In the oaae of inches ter 
v. Foster.*7 Foster is a resident and tar payer in the city 
of Winoheeter and brought suit to permit his nleoe to attend 
the city schoole of Winchester without the payment of tui­
tion. Foster had agreed to support, clothe and maintain his 
niece until she was twenty-one years of age. The girl was 
for several years under twenty-one, so the arrangement would 
last for some time, but the point in law is that it was not 
permanent.
The Court found that the girl was not a bona fide res­
ident. The uncle was not her guardian, she was not appren­
ticed to him and be had no control over hey. He was only 
responsible while the girl wae with the family. The relation 
was not permanent and parental.
Minors my have residence for school purposes other 
than the domicile of their parents. The test for uuob resi­
dence is not the same aa that for s u f f r a g e . T h e  test is 
whether the arrangement 2ms been made in good faith, if the 
ohlld has been brought in for educational purposes* and if 
the relationship is permanent and parental.
<1 *% "»         n i
Board of Education of Winchester v, Foster (1903)
116 KY.484, 76 3fS45
18Mt. Rope School District v, Hendrickson (1916) 197 
Iowa 191, 197KW47
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Summary of Points in Law of Chanter 3
(1) Each case must be determined on its individual
merits.
(2) A child emancipated and earning its own living 
is entitled to residence*
(3) Children living in licensed homes are residents 
of the district the home Is located in.
(4) Children living in hones that have as part of 
their purpose to educate the children are not residents.
(6) Children living in hones that are not licensed 
are not residents.
(0) The fact that an orphanage pays or dees not pay 
taxes has no bearing on the case.
(7) Children placed in boarding homes for the purpose 
of talcing advantage of educational facilities are not resi­
dents.
(8) The length of the residence in a district has no 
bearing on the case.
(9) The statutes relating to free public schools 
should be liberally construed.
(10) Guardianship to be valid must be permanent and
parental.
(11) Arrangements for the care of children must be 
judged by the visual foots and not by the possible secret
mental Intentions.
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(13) Guardianship that l® penal and temporary Is not 
parental and permanent.
(15) Ohlldren may have residence other than with 
their parents for sohool purposes.
(14) The tost for school privileges Is not the same 
as for the right of suffrage.
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CHAPTER 4
T0I7I0H AHD THE RESIDENT 3TUIERT
The constitutions of moat of the states declare that 
the public schools of the state shall be free. The phrase 
has not been Interpreted the same in all states. florae states 
furnish transportation to the school and some furnish the 
books that are used. In general, it rmy be said that the 
more recent a state has been admitted to the Tin!on the more 
liberal are its school laws.
All of the courts of the state reports examined 
agreed that tuition or the charge for instruction should be 
free. At first this only applied to the eight grades, but 
with the universal acceptance of the high school, it also 
has been included in the scope of the free public school.
The courts of Alabama in 1931 allowed a four dollar 
matriculation fee to be charged. The constitution of Ala­
bama reads that the public schools shall provide liberal 
public schools, so the courts held the school boards were 
within their rights in charging this fee. The four dollar 
fa© in Lincoln was evidently held to be reasonable, for in 
1910 the same court ruled that there was a well defined dis­
tinction between tuition and an incidental fee, and in 1919 
they ruled that such fee® could be charged but that they 
must be reasonable. Reasonable In this case was twenty-five 
cents a month.
The Incidentel Fee. By the incidental fee is meant
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that charge for suoh Items as wood and water for the school 
building to assure the comfort of the children. A rule In 
force was that the children of indigent were erempt.
The courts hare made a distinotion between tuition 
and the incidental fee for such purposes as heating, light­
ing, etc. This fact has been recognised by the Supreme 
Court of Alabama. In 1910, the Sourer** Court of Alabama 
held that a charge of twenty-five cents a month for wood 
end water was permissible by the County Board. The daughter 
of Bryant1 wee refused instruction as she refused to pay this 
fee. The court held that the fee was reasonable, within the 
power of the Board, her father was well able to pay, so the 
fee oould be made a condition for admission to the sohool.
Rad her father been indigent, she would have been aroused.
Although incidental fees in Alabama are permissible,
2the fee must be reasonable. The Sohool Board of Coal City 
made assessment against the pupils for amounts ranging from 
fifty cents, seventy-five cents and one dollar, depending 
on the grad© the child was in. The payments were made the 
condition for admittance to the sohool. It was found that 
a fee of twenty-five cents was sufficient for the item# al­
lowed by law? that 1#, for wood, water, ©to. The balance,
If any, was to be used to augment the teachers* salaries.
In view of the fact that a fee of twenty-five cents was
^Bryant v":.TOeenanT'"(lm'OTiSTXia. 336, 52 So 525.
Roberson v. Oliver (1919) 189 Ala. 438 . 66 So 695.
deeaed sufficient for the incidentals* It would appear that 
the teacher*® salary wan kept in mind when the rate war wet. 
Using a part of the Incidental fee for the teacher*s salary 
made the fee In reality a tuition payment. The Softool 
Board ha® power to charge a reasonable amount for Incident­
al fee®. The amount charged in this case was more than 
necessary for these incidentals. This, coupled with the 
fact that part of the fee wag to he used for tuition, made 
the charge Illegal. The School Beard*a plea that the money 
received from the District was not sufficient to run the 
school, while true, could have no weight in the Court*e 
decision. The fee had to be reasonable, which it wr® not, 
the only point of interest to the Court*
In a similar case" , the School Board authorised the 
teaoher to collect a one dollar fee per pupil per month.
The Court ruled, as in the other case, that a twenty-five 
cents fee was sufficient for the Incidentals. The Softool 
Board ftad over-stepped its authority in allowing the 
teacher to collect the dollar fee. Admittedly, the salary 
m m  low and the Board was without resources to supplement 
the pay in any other way. The Softool would etill have to 
be conducted according to law and the statutes.
Special Fees. While tuition could not be charged In 
Kentucky, it was felt that for subjects not included in the
^Hughes v. Outlaw (1916) 19? Ala. 463, 73 80 16
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regular course of study a special fee could be charged,4 
The subjects were to be taught during the regular school 
time and credit would be given. The Courts ruled that the 
ichool Board was within Its rights In authorising the teach­
er to charge for this additional service.
tlon is a charge for instruction. Schools that charge tui­
tion or a fee for Instruction oannot be oalled free schools. 
In the free public school, the payment of tuition falls on 
the public in the form of taxes. When this charge is met 
In part by the public, the school must be classified as a 
free public school. That is, a school cannot be for a cart 
of the year a public school and a private school for the re­
mainder of the time.
In some states the support of the public schools has 
not been strong. All of the states have, at different times, 
experienced difficulty in properly financing their schools 
because of economic conditions. At different times the 
School Boards, often with the eonsent of the natrons, have 
attempted to remedy the lack of support by regulations of 
their own or by their own interpretation of the existing 
statutes. The constitutionality of laws passed for the ex­
press purpose of charging tuition will not be dealt with 
here, but the court cases on the attempts of School Boards 
to take the initiative will be given.
4M&jox v . Oayee (1895)98 Ky. 35?7 33 Sf 93.
There were attempts to run the school® a© part time 
public school© and part time private schools. Some felt 
that the approval of a majority of the patrons could author­
ize the Board to charge tuition, While it is true that a 
school may operate on money from private sources as well a© 
from public, it would not alter the fact that the school was 
still a public school and tuition free. If all patrons were 
of the same mind and all willing to pay a tuition fee, a 
school would be run aa a combination public and private 
school, but such common consent would not moke it a legal 
school. Any one person could bring suit against such a 
school if denied free admission and would be supported by 
the courts. The only way such a school could legally con­
tinue , would be for the patrons so minded to make voluntary 
contributions and allow those not so minded to attend free. 
There is nothing to prevent an individual from giving money 
to the school in addition to the tax he pays if he wishes 
to do so, but the point is that no child eligible under the 
state laws could be exoluded from a school supported in such 
a manner, or admission be conditioned upon the payment of 
tuition.
The point is illustrated by the case of Brinson v. 
Jackson.® The patrons of this school district demanded a 
nine month school but there were funds sufficient only to 
maintain the school for six months. The plan formulated was
53rinson v. Jackson (1939) 168 O a . 353, 148 8E 98.
to charge a air dollar matriculation fee for the month© of 
September, October end May. The fee wee wade a condition 
for admittance to the school. The plaintiffs ashed for an 
injunction to prevent the defendant from denying admittance 
to the school.
The school was maintained in part toy funds provided 
toy the AS,t.,P& AAIICTCiJLLL.JfAg.jLA.ff.li, JLuJaaZl- ’Phis
fact stopped the defendants from denying that the school was 
subject to the constitutional provision making the school 
free to the children of the state.
Sarller in th© earns state a similar plan had been •
tried. The plan was to run the school as a public school for
6sir months, and the other thro as a private school. During 
these three months, the trustees mould have nothing to do 
with the school, no tar money was to be used during this per­
iod, the same staff of teachers would continue, and the school 
would be held in the regular school building. The decision 
bended down by the Supreme Court of Georgia was that "a 
school whose existence depends upon antecedent action by the 
school officers and which could not be taught except by the 
use of a .school house exclusively by law for the purpose of 
education must be considered a public school and a fee cannot 
be charged". If the school had been in some rented hall and 
none of the public school equipment used, it would have been
°Claxton v. Stanford (1925) 180 0®. 753, 188 SB 881.
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perfectly legal.
m\ fflfl .fiflafafll- Management
end control cannot be construed to give any powers beyond 
their ordinary meaning, nor include the right to charge tui­
tion ? In a school District in South Carolina, additional 
money was needed to run the school properly. The trustees 
decided they had the power to charge tuition m  the state Act 
of 1896, section 32, gave them the power to manage and con­
trol the School District. The Court held that the right to 
nonage end control the district did not include the right to 
charge ttiition. Charging tuition did not come under ordin­
ary meaning of the phrase, and they had no power to interpret 
the Act in that way. *7
Or-pfrlnn..-of .CretHtg. C3
tlon. A School District that had m d e  the payment of tuition 
the condition for the admittance to the school had permitted
o
a girl to enter on condition that the tuition be paid later. 
The girl the next year transferred to a different school and 
asfced that her credits be transferred to the new school. The 
transfer was denied as she had not paid the tuition demanded 
in the first school. The Court held that the credits could 
not be withheld as the tuition charged was illegal,
LmtemZmte. *h® liability of the School
7 T .... r '"T'r 'v‘Young v. Trustees of Fountain Inn eroded School
(1897) 84 30 131, 41 8K 834.
^Roberts ▼. Wilson (1927) 397 m  419.
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District ©;ids when the four year high school course has been 
finished.9 the children in this case had completed a four 
year course in an approved school. The father then sent them 
to a different school for additional courses and ashed hie 
district, which did not maintain a high school, to pay the 
tuition. The father held that as long as the home district 
did not maintain a high school in the district, they ware 
liable for high school subjects taken elsewhere, the ruling 
was that the district is only liable until a four year 
course has bean completed, and not as long as setae one may 
wish to go.
the 82.se ruling is applied to students who have fin­
ished a prescribed course and wish to return for additional 
work. The Board is within its rights in such cases to 
charge tuition, but it is not mandatory,
ilrlVAtb. .amL-^flatarlaa Johoola. The high school of 
today is of comparatively recent development. Before its 
development, secondary education was in a large measure 
taken care of by the academy. These academies were private 
schools organized by individuals or in many oases, by church­
es. The difference between a private school and a sectarian 
on© is that a private school is very similar to a public one 
except that it is osmed and controlled by private individuals. 
The sectarian school is owned and controlled by a church,
, % e w  Hampton Institution v, Northwooa School District
(190?) 68 A 538.
with the instruction of religion playing on important part.
Before the development of the high school, it was 
customary for the school districts to make arrangements with 
the academies in the district to send their high school stu­
dents to the academies for the school work. Where there is 
not a state statute to the contrary, this may still be done.
Some states have laws limiting the legal arrangements 
that school districts may make with non-public schools. In 
South Dakota such a law exists.10 The Pleasant Vale School 
District Ho. 53 discontinued it® school. According to the 
law, they made provisions for the children to attend school 
elsewhere. Klebanja sent his children to St, Martin*a Acad­
emy, a sectarian school in Rapid 01ty. The Board agreed to 
pay the tuition, but the Chairman, Mr. Brewer, refused to 
sign the warrant. The Chairman was upheld by the Court.
Dnder ^aaUan...T^.Saa^.^a,Uga..„7i^, ,CMv^..J2g.da.JLS12)» legal 
arrangements could not be made with any non-public school. 
St. Martin*s was not a public school, so arrangements for 
the payment of tuition from Hlebanja* s school district could 
not be made.
Private schools that accept public funds are classi­
fied as public schools. The revenue that an academy re­
ceives comes mainly from the tuition charged, a right they 
have. However, If the academy accepts public funds for a
l0Hlebanja v.Brewer(l931) 338 I* 296.
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"common school department" it come a under the common school 
lllaws. In the case of 111 son. v.„ .Stanford. the Onion Baptist 
Institute accepted public money for a common school depart­
ment. The patrons of the school district held that they did 
not hare to pay the matriculation fee because of this. The 
Court ruled that a private school accepting public money 
would come under the public school laws of the state, and as 
such. could not charge tuition to the residents of the dis­
trict, If the money received was net sufficient, they could 
refuse to make such arrangements.
Model Schools. The model schools referred to in this 
study are those schools that are connected with the State 
Universities, Teachere Colleges, and normal Schools. The 
purpose of these schools is to provide a practical training 
for the teachers being trained in the state schools.
The state schools of higher learning are almost al­
ways located in cities that maintain schools of their own. 
Some of the students may come from the outlying districts 
end the tuition is paid by these districts according to law. 
The dispute is not over these children, but those from the 
oity district.
The majority of the students of the model schools have 
been from the school district of the local schools. The 
question is, whether or not the model school may charge the 
local eohool district tuition for the students attending the
U W i l e o n T T W n F o V a .(T§a$y"TS! Oa.483 , 06 SE 358.
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model school.
The school districts hare maintained that they have 
already established a school that renders the service re­
quired by law. It is not necessary for the students to at­
tend the model school, as the school district has established 
qualified schools in the district. It is permissible for 
the children of the district to attend the model school, but 
if they do, no tuition should be charged. In fact, tuition 
oannot be charged, as the model school is a publio school 
established by the state. The state is charged by law with 
providing a free education for all children of school ago. 
Therefore, this state school for those of school age should 
be free.
It has been held that for a school to be free, it
must be under the direction and oa trol of officers estab-
12liehed for that purpose. The city schools are tinder the 
control of the Board of Eduoation created by the state for 
that purpose, and so are charged with providing a free edu­
cation for the children of school age in the district, On 
the other hand, the model sohool is under the control of 
the officials of the college, which is not a free publio 
sohool.
In North Dakota, a law was passed to permit model 
schools to charge tuition for students in attendance. The 
Court held the law to be constitutional. The Court ©aln-
iaState Teachers College v. Morris (1933) 144 90 374.
tainsd that the city school district received benefits from, 
the model school even though they maintained their own 
schools. It was possible for them to properly maintain 
their schools with fewer teachers, removed the possibility 
of having to build new schools, etc. The legislature was 
within its power when it charged a reasonable rate for the 
facilities afforded the pupils of the special school dis­
trict.*3
Any redress the special school district might have 
would not be with the courts, they would have to go to the 
legislature and remedy the situation by law.13 4
Summary of Points in haw of Chapter 4
(1) In some states an Incidental fee for heating 
and lighting may be charged, but the fee must be reasonable.
(2) The right to control and regulate the district 
does not include the right to charge tuition.
(3) The consent of the majority of patrons in a 
district does not legalise the oharging of tuition.
(4) Tuition way be charged for subjects not in the 
regular coarse of study.
< 5) Tuition is only free until the four year high 
school course has been completed.
(») Schools conducted in public school buildings are
Special School District13State v. Valley 01“vy~ ' t a ------ ' •—(1919) 4 | ^ D 404, 173 HP 760
Ibid
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free schools.
(?) Schools cannot be conducted ea part time free 
schools and part time private schools,
(8) Credits cannot be withheld upon the non-payment 
of tuition.
(9) Private schools accepting public funds are 
classified as public schools.
(10) Xn some states * such ae South Dakota, legal 
arrangements cannot be made with non-public schools.
(11) Model schools may charge tuition for children 
attending from local school districts.
4 4** **1
OHAPTKR 5
TUTTIOH ASD K0K-RS3IDKNT flTHDRNTa 
The school districts of a state are bound by law to 
provide a free education for all children of rohool age, 
otherwise eligible, who are residents of the school district. 
This does not scan that each school district must provide 
the physical equipment to furnish enoh an education. If such 
equipment is not furnished, the law requires that some ar­
rangement must be made to furnish the education required by 
law.
The usual arrangement, in case the local district 
does not provide facilities, is to arrange with some other 
district to educate the children, paying tuition for such 
services. It has been well established that a district le 
not liable for the education of a child from another dis­
trict, they are responsible only for the children of their 
own dletriot. Children attending from another district must 
pay tuition. By this, it is not meant that the children or 
their parents must pay, but that the district charged with 
the responsibility of the education oust. In some states, 
the tuition it paid by the state, at least in part.
lAfthUlte. .s01atal.g.lui,., to, ..XuA.1t1L.flaa • The fact that & 
district has never maintained or authorised a high school 
does not mean that their obligation ends there. High schools
are now considered a part of the free public school system. 
The very fact that a dletriot does not maintain a
high school in sufficient reason to attend a high school 
elsewhere.1 2 The state law in this case imposed a quasi con­
tract or obligation upon the School District, Edna Simonson 
had finished the eighth grade in her home district imd then 
attended high school in Yankton. She wished to oolleot tui­
tion fro® hex district, an they did not maintain a high 
school. The district did not allow the payment m  they held 
they were not liable, as a high school had newer been author­
ised in the district. Edna, to attend a high school, which 
was her right, had to attend elsewhere; the proper procedure 
had been followed in applying for tuition, so the dietriot 
wae liable.
The obligation of a school district to provide educa­
tion implies that the education must be provided when the 
eligible children are ready for It. Educational facilities, 
for example, cannot be denied the children until the home 
district is ready to provide them. In the case of F i s h y . 
liuntlm ton^. Fisk had followed the proper procedure in ap­
plying for tuition for his children. Huntington, having no 
high school of their own, was required to make some arrange* 
*aent for euoh m  education. The request for tuition was ap­
parently refused for no other reason than that the next year 
Huntington would have their own high school. They felt that
the children of Fisk could wait a year to continue their»
1Board of Education of the City ofYankton, School Dis­
trict Ho. 19 (1909) 33 3. D. 439, 133 H» 411.
2Fisk v. Inhabitants of the Town of Huntington, 179 Miss. g7l, 61 HE 200
education. The fact that the school district refused the 
request for tuition that had been made with the proper pro­
cedure taade the school district liable. "The failure of s 
town to grant a proper request la sufficient refusal to ren­
der the town liable for tuition. The law is constitutional 
so long as the money is expended by the authorities of the 
town or city in which the money ie to be expended."
Generally speaking, children are given the option of 
attending the most convenient school. Distance by the main 
traveled roads being the criteria by which this point ie 
established. This is not always the point, however, where
the case is that of whether or not a home district offers a
3four year hi#t school. In the case of
Garter sent his children to a high school in Stuart, which 
was two miles away. Garter paid the tuition one year, but 
after that expected his district to pay the tuition under 
the statutes of Chapter 146 of the 34th, General assembly, 
which states that a district not offering a four year high 
school, should pay the tuition.
The home district did not maintain a high school, but 
a County high school was organised in the county where the 
district was located. It was held that, although the Guth­
rie County High School was thirteen miles away, It mad© the 
Long Branch District a school corporation offering a four
. ^Board o? Education, Diet. Ho. 7 v. School Dist. Bo. 
66 (1914) 301 111. App. 439.
year high school course and bo h o b  not liable for the tuition.
„,9h. T r ^ s f g x , pX  „9k?.tz&.ta• 
Although districts are liable for tuition where they do not 
provide the necessary facilities, it does not mem that they 
have no voice in the natter of tuition oayraont. The dis­
tricts must be ashed, and approve the transaction. Refusal, 
as has been seen, may make them liable, but at least they
must be consulted on the matter. In the case of the Board
4, 3 ? l a ,ju T&hwlU&rtxXQtM>.> the 
parents of five ohlldren of District Seven consulted the 
Directors of District 66 about their ohlldren attending 
school in District S3. The transect ion was agreed to, but 
the Directors of Ho. 7 were not informed. The tuition could 
not be recovered as the home directors had not boon asked to 
approve the eohool selected by the parents In accordance with 
aas^.iigXfc-2iU.JL215* JfoaaJtel .123 »■ Jgft» I* the direct­
ors had been consulted, the school selected being the logic­
al one, the refusal of the Directors of District Ho, 7 would 
not have released them from their liability.
The last point mentioned is further illustrated by the 
case of «6 The pupile of Wolcott, the
boo® district, were attending school in Hardwick. One day 
a director of Hardwick met a director from Woloott and told
. ♦Board of Eduoation Ho. ^ v. School Diet. Ho, 36 
(1914) 301 111. App. 439.
____. flown Diet, of Hardwick v. Town Diet, of Wolcott,
(1906) 76 v*. 33, 61 A. 471.
him that they could no longer educate the children of the 
Wolcott district at the same tuition. Kothing more was done
and the children continued in the Hardwick school with the
knowledge of the foloott directors. Tb& Hardwick directors
relied upon this knowledge, and the information given them, 
to collect the tuition. The .Voloott District was held for 
the tuition. They had been approached for their approval, 
had failed to designate a different school and allowed the 
continued attendance of the children. Here the negative
action was sufficient to ocoiee their liability.
flamandlna Tuition. The word, demand, In the lavs
governing tuition have been held to mean "to make applies*6
tion*. The tuition cannot be forced under any conditions, 
but the regular procedure must be followed. In this case, the 
children of lire. Riley, residing in Clarendon, wished to go 
to the Wallingford school, which was more conveniently lo* 
cated. The Clarendon directors argued, stating the money paid 
should be considered transportation. Late; they told Krs. Ri* 
ley the practice would have to end. The Town of Wallingford 
attempted to collect tuition on the gounds of an implied 
contract, and the knowledge of the Clarendon Board that the 
children were attending the Wallingford school.
The Clarendon school had acted within their rights 
in refusing to pay the tuition. To demand tuition meant
© -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
_ _  Town of ValUngford v. Town of Clarendon (1908) 81 Vt. 845, 39 A. 734.
that aii application for tuition m a t  bo r.iade. The tuition 
could not be collected after the notice bad been sent to 
wire. Riley. In this ©a*©, tfee Clarendon Board had taken 
action, and being within their righto, the notice was valid*
Similar bourses* The word *• similar* has been held
7to uean to bear resemblenoe, but not completely identical. 
The importance of this word is based on the e&re where a 
school Board refused to pay tuition in another district as 
they maintained a similar course. Had the word si..ilar 
meant having characteristics in common, like in fora, sire, 
appearance, quality, and not merely bearing resemblance, the 
home district would have been compelled to pay the tuition, 
The Bounty Superintendent had assigned the students to tbs 
Rose Township School, but the fnot that the home district 
maintained a *similar" course, exempted that: from tuition 
payments. *v
,fak..Ati]dftttaas&. Districts may 
have to pay tuition for their resident children la other 
districts, providing their schools are not more conveniently 
located. Ho set rule has been established a© to Just what 
makes for a convenient school. In a sparsely settled dis­
trict, the most convenient may be fifteen miles away. In 
thickly settled districts, the matter of a few miles way be 
the deciding point. The rule that ie followed in determin-
vBoard of 'x&teation of Hose 'Towaa&lo v. Board of Ed­
ucation of Silvercreek Township (1931) 440 Ohio, Aop. 335, 
188, HIE 307.
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ing the most convenient school in to choose the meartst rub- 
lio route. Factor? such as crossing railroad traobe, voor 
roads, dangerous cross roads, to., nay enter In, toot thee© 
arc factors for the fhtpeyintendent of the County to decide. 
The general rule is the nearest public maintalned highway.
A resident of a school district being more conven­
iently located to a school In another district way have the 
t tilt Ion for hla children paid for in that district by the
i
home district.
8In the once of .Bed: v. Iron. Book lived air and one 
half mile* from the school In the home county, and seven 
miles from the adjoining county. His m m  were sent to the 
school in the adjoining county of dal dwell. Caldwell sued 
Bach for tuition of hi a two eons attending their school.
Beet maintained that the liability was that of hie home 
County, Lyons. He gave notice to the Lyons County authori­
ties of his desire to send his mtm to the Caldwell school 
but this plea, was denied. He then Instituted action to 
force the payment.
The Lyon County Board had to pay the tuition, as it 
m.@ held that the Caldwell school was the more convenient, 
because of conditions of the roads to the Lyons school. How­
ever, on the principle of having a voice In the matter, they 
did not have to pay until after the notice had been given.
BBeck v. Lyon <1933) 31? Ky. 67, 388 3W 1012.
t o g u a s . » *&« t ^ o r n t  o f
tuition due a district educating non-resident children dif­
fers In different state®. Of the ceres found and examined 
there was little uniformity In the decisions. The courts all 
agreed that the district educating non-resident students 
should not be expected to pay for extending* such services.
The difference in the findings mm  who should pay for such 
services. The court of the State of Iowa held that the par­
ents could be made to nay the difference between the tuition 
paid and the instructional costs. The Hebmoka court held 
that where the costs were different, the district could re­
fuse to admit students, but if they did not, extra charge 
could be made. Oregon and Indiana agreed that the hone dis­
trict should be held liable for the difference in cost.
9In the Iowa cnee, Mabel and Florence Chambers resid­
ed in Calhoun Township where no hi^h school was mlntvlnod. 
They attended fci^h school in Missouri Valley and were charged 
seven dollars tuition. The hone district jm$& eight dollars, 
making a total tuition of fifteen dollars. The parents ob­
jected to paying the seven dollare on the ground© that 
ShS2tfi£.2 fiiL-ASlflJlC..!&£., LlSGMl&Z limited the
amount that one district could charge another, end also that 
it prohibited then from charging the parents.
The court held that the state legislature did not in­
tend that non-resident children should pay lees tuition than
Chambers v. Everett (1931) 191 lows 49, 181 »W 86V.
resident children. They felt that school beards would re- 
file© to accent children uni© a* the difference in tuition 
mr equalised. The ruling mw that non-resident students 
could be charged tuition in addition to what thoir district 
raid.
The Kebrasha case5-0 ruled that neither the hone dis­
trict nor the parent or guardian could be charged with the 
additional tuition. The State Legislature had authorised 
one dollar m d  fifty cento weekly tuition to be >ald by the 
hone district. Dan Baldwin, from dietriot Be. 73, attended 
school in Hebron and hi® home dietriot paid the one dollar 
and fifty cento prescribed in the lav/. After a time, the 
Hebron school asked ran additional one dollar and fifty cents 
from Ban Baldwin.
The Ckmrfc ruled that under certain conditions a 
school district c m  refuse admittance to non-recident stu­
dents, but if they do admit them all they can receive is 
the one dollar and fifty cent© allowed by law.
Tlie Hebron school maintained a standard in excess of 
that required by the High School Manual and so could not ex­
pect other districts to help maintain that standard. On
this point, the HebresVn Court seemed to stand alone.
1 1The Indiana Court ruled entirely different or: the 
point as to who should pay the tuition. The Ferry school
^‘pBaldwin v . Dorsey (l9B3) 108 Hebr. 134, IB? JTO 879. 
_  __ _ ^ « r r  v. Perry School Township (1S04) 103 Ind. 310,t Cf iPMKw »
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operates five months, the Bloomington school operates nine 
Months. The P e r r y School Board maintained that they were
liable to the Bloomington District for fire months tuition, 
which wa* ell the students untild hare received in the horse
district. The court ruled "that shore a student transfers 
frosts on© district to another where the terra is longer, the 
tuition payable to the creditor district is not limited by 
the tens of the resident district*. Here the court ruling 
would not penalise a district for maintaining a higher 
standard than a neighboring district, not would they be ex­
pected to bear a part of the cost for education for non­
resident students.
The Oregon Court in 1933, followed the same line of 
reasoning as did the Indiana court. In the ot.se of u^ith 
v. .Barnard*^ the state legislature arbitrnrly set the tui­
tion rate to bo paid to high school districts by non-resi­
dent high school districts. The Eugene High School, had a 
dsily attendance of seven hundred. Two hundred and twenty- 
five of these were non-resident students. The per capita 
cost per pupil was eighty-nine dollars. For the non-resi­
dent students, Eugene received sixty dollars for the first 
twenty, fifty dollars for the second twenty, and thirty-five 
dollars for the remainder.
The cost of the high school for educating the two 
hundred end twenty-five non-resident student© amounted to
X2Snith v . Barnard (1933) 21 P 3 n d 304
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treaty thousand and twenty-five dollars. For thie servi ce 
they received eight thoue&md, sir hundred end seventy-five 
doll are. In addition to thin, the Xurene tar-payer had to 
contribute a 1.86 mill levy to the fund that the eight 
thousand, air hundred on <5 seven ty-flre doll ere came from.
It coat the City of Eugene over twelve thousand dollars to 
educate the two hundred and twenty-five non-resident stu­
dents. The court ruled that the I»«r was unconstitutional 
a® it pieced an uneourl burden cm the taxpayer of Eugene 
and also deprived the district receiving* such student? of 
the due process of law,
Summary of Points in him of Chapter 5
(1) School districts are liable only for the* educa­
tion of resident students.
(2) The fact that a district has never approved a 
high school does not relieve them from tuition liability.
(3) A district not offering a four year high school 
course is liable for tuition.
<4) Educational facilities roust be provided when 
the children are ready for them.
(5) Refusal to grant a penalt to attend the school 
in a different district m y  render the district liable for 
tuition.
(6) Convenience in attending school roust be con­
sidered.
(7) Directors of the hoa» district rmot be consulted
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m  to what school shall he attended.
(S) to demand tuition means to make application fox 
tuition,
(8) *Similar coursesH are course® alike hut not coa-
•plotely identical,
(10) Resident students are not expected to pay more 
tuition than non-resident students*
(11) Placing the burden of education of non-resident 
students on the home district is depriving the taxpayers of 
the home district of due process of law.
CHAPTER 6
THE Q0H3TITUTX ORAL! TY OF TOITIOH LAWS
In the study of the court cnees, it was found that 
lavs permitting one district to educate it* children at the 
expense of another district were not constitutional. It 
was found that when a state legislature passed a law set­
ting a certain tuition limit that might be paid, the amount 
many times was not sufficient to pay for the cost of edu­
cating the non-resident students. To permit such action 
would allow an unequal burden of taxation and also deprive 
the people of the non-resident district of due process of 
law.
The question of constitutionality of the laws was not 
whether or not it was constitutional to charge tuition. The 
right of the etate legislature to charge one district for 
services performed in ano&er district is not questioned.
The tuition paid by one district to another is paid by pub- 
11© money and so would not oonfliot with the theory of a 
free public school system.
The question involved was the amount of tuition set 
by the State Legislature. The fact that tuition was charged
did not enter into the case. The question was if the amount 
set by the Legislature was legal, ahd if the amount would
have to be adhered to in oase it was not sufficient to cover 
the cost® of the non-resident district.
The courts all agreed that the non-resident district
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should not hear the cost of educating the children from an­
other district. They did not all agree, however, as to who 
should nay the difference. Only the court of one state, that 
of Iowa, held that the parents could he charged for the dif­
ference. One court held that it oould not he paid at all, 
and that the non-resident district would have to refuse ad­
mittance to non-resident students, and the rest held that 
the home district could he charged for the balance.
The court oases to he examined in this chapter will 
deal with those cases that permit the patrons of a district 
to he charged tuition.
To he constitutional, laws passed hy the state legis­
latures must he in harmony with the state eonetitutlon. In 
every oaae hut one, it was found that laws allowing the 
charging of tuition conflicted with the state constitution. 
Where the legislature is charged with the establishing of a 
free public sohool system, tuition may not be charged. The 
exception was the state of Alabama. The constitution of 
Alabama establishes a liberal school system which allows the 
charging of s matriculation fee.
Another point was established in the cases examined. 
There was some doubt as to whether or not the high sohool 
should bs included in the public school system. The courts 
held that the four year high sohool was a part of the free 
publie school system,
A-Lib«rel Public,sohool System. When a constitution
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establishes a free or liberal school system, there Is a Ques­
tion as to Just shat a free or liberal school system is. The 
final interpretation rests with the state Supreme Court. The 
Alabama supreme Court ruled that a liberal school system could 
not allow the charging of a matriculation fee. Under a free 
school aystem, such a fee would not be permissible.
In the case of JBfi&KL.a*.
Iftnadttfla-qjMaate1 . Vincent, the father of two children, re­
fused to pay a four dollar matrimilatlon fee in the public 
schools of Lincoln. He refused to pay on the gvounds that 
such & fee, although authorised by the Board, could not be 
charged in a public school.
The court held that under a constitution that re­
quired a liberal school system, details of management, in­
cluding the charging of such fees may be left to the school 
Board. The opinion of Justice J. Sayre was as follows!
“The argument against the constitutional validity of the 
section proceeds upon the hypothesis that the constitution 
establishes a system of free public schools ------- It ie
quite evident that, if the framers of the constitution had 
thought to impose upon the legislature the duty to establish 
a system of free public schools they would have used Just 
that word*•
The Supreme Court of Kansas ruled that a common school
^Vincent v. County Board of Education of Talladega County (1931) 131 SO 893.
5 9
system meant a free school system. It seems doubtful that 
the Alabama Court would have ruled the sane as the Kansas 
Court In interpreting the word common.
iL.g.aima...£\!tb,n£.Sstml, .sm^a.* the case of m m l
3fli-Sduflation .of. Pity of.Lawrence v....Disk , the Board of Edu­
cation authorised Its superintendent to expel all students 
who refused to pay a tuition fee of two dollars and fifty 
cents per term. The Board held they had the right to make 
this charge under the laws of I&a?.,L£jSSiU..I 2QI«J3ia5).
This bill permitted a oity of the second class to operate a 
high school end maintain it In whole or in part by fees.
The oltisens objected to this payment as unconstitutional.
The Court held that to charge suoh a fee was unconstitution­
al as it violated that section of the constitution calling 
for a common school system. Justice J. Greene* s opinion in 
upholding the decision was as follows* “It must be assumed 
that the men who wrote the Constitution used the phrase "com- 
lion school s’* in its technical sense, as we find it defined.
We think it follows therefore both from authority and reason 
that the phrase "common schools* was used in the constitution 
in Its technical sense, which means free schools, and that 
the common schoola of Kansas are free*.
The Supreme Court of Kansas in ruling on this case, 
interpreted the word "ootsmon" to mean free by following a
, „ 3Board of Education of the City of Lawrence v. Dick(1904) 70 Kan. 434, 78 P. 812.
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literal construction, on school laws. Alabama ha© always 
bom acre conservative on matter© pertaining to public edu­
cation, The Kansas court followed the wore liberal feeling
of the Berth and ‘Vest in its Interpretation,
A© the high school of today has become popular since many 
state constitutions have teen adopted# it was necessary to 
establish the principle of the free high school. The public 
hi£h school by common concent of the people is considered 
a part of the public school system. The fact that the peo­
ple of a state give their enaction to sahing the high school 
a part of the free public school system would not stake it a 
legal part of the school system. High schools could be main­
tained in districts that mm willing to be tared for that 
purpose# but the principle would have to be established by 
the courts in the absence of any different law on the matter# 
In 1919# the State Legislature of Arkansas authorised 
the School Boards of the state to charge tuition to support 
their high schools. The School Board of Logan Comity decid­
ed to take advantage of this a© they did not possess suf­
ficient fund® to support their high school without the spec­
ial foe, A patron, Mr. Bangs, brought suit to prevent this 
charge on the grounds that such a fee would be unconstitu­
tional
**»—« '•mrnmutm . .... '■«. . HWMW
Logan County Board of Education v. Bangs (1930) 144 
Ajfc. 34 221 m  1060.
6 1
The court held that the special act was unconstitu­
tional . The ooraon schools included the high school which 
meant that the high schools had to be free. The fact that 
the district was without sufficient funds to maintain a 
high school could not make the law oonstitutional. If the? 
lacked the funda they- had the power to limit the schoole to 
the lower grades.
«jggfflaU2R flt,imuaa.ijnarsmA • to indigent 
parents are legal but not neoessary. The charging of tuition 
in those states that maintain a free public eobool system 
is not legal, regardless of ability to pay or not. In a 
state such as Alabama, a law exempting indigent parents may 
be necessary,
In the case of Peonies v. Moors4 a law had been passed 
by the legislature exempting the patrons unable to pay but 
charging the rest. Thirteen children from the Soeelawn dis­
trict were given permission to attend high school in the 
Danville district. All of the parents except two were able
to pay the tuition. The Hoeelawn school Board paid the tui­
tion for all thirteen children. Later they started action 
to recover tuition from the eleven that could afford to pay.
The action was based on the Act of May 35. 190? (Laws.ISO?, 
o. 533) which stated that tuition shall be free only to 
those whose parents or guardians cannot afford to pay.
People V.' Moore (1909) 240 111. 408 , 88 NS 979.
The court ruled as the Legislature could only estab­
lish free school® and the high school® being a part of the 
public school system must also be free. If the right of the 
school® is extended to the pupil® of other districts, it 
would hare to be on the same term® to all. Therefor©, the 
special not granting exemption® to some was unconstitutional.
The earn© ruling was applied in the case of Mercer
nmgB..,agtafll, .Tqantihta «*»«*« » ruling
had been made exempting the children of the Veteran® of the 
Civil tfar.
Summary of Point® in Law of Chapter 0
Cl) The State Supreme Courts must decide if tuition 
may be charged in the public school system of the state*
(2) The high schools are accepted as a part of the 
public school system.
(3) The exemption of tuition must be made on the 
sajrse basis to all.
(4) State Legislature® may not pass law® granting the 
right to charge tuition contrary to their state constitution.
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m m u m a a
The establishing of a public school system of the 
United State® hm hem. left to the states* Ho stmt® ha® 
neglected its children of school age, It Is true that the 
children are not all equally taken oar® of; the school l a w  
in all tIs® states are not equally liberal in providing an 
education; m &  it Is also equally true that mil states do 
not have equal financial ability to provide sn educr.tion.
The state® mil recognise the need for & free public 
school education of its youth in their constitutions. These 
constitutions ere not worded the same nor have they been In­
terpreted the same by the different Supreme Courts of the 
states. They do, however, all establish a public school 
system.
Any child of school mg® in the United States will 
find sduamtlcfcal facilities provided for hiss at a© cost to 
himself or parent® or guardians, To •Mttistsr a hasinsss 
as hug® m  the public school system, rules and regulations 
are necessary. There may be times when enforcing these 
rules, there may seem to be a miscarriage of Justice and ssmt 
one denied any opportunity for education, 'then such situa­
tion® arise, the recourse is the courts of the states and 
the Supreme ©curt of the states hm hem liberal in their
construction of the school laws.
The various Supreme Courts of the state® have decided 
that free public schools and common public schools are to
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b© free schools. Under the state constitutions, the legisla­
ture® nay not authorize School Boards to charge tuition.
The state, through it® subdivision, the school district, is 
held responsible for the education of the children of the 
school district. In fact, the states go so far m  to insist 
Upon children up to a certain age attending school. Only 
after a certain age ha® been reached or certain attainment® 
in school stranding® been made, doe® the responsibility of 
the state end.
A problem of the future not touched upon by this study 
is that problem created by a part of our mobile population. 
Many people today are living in auto-trailers or tourist 
camps. The education of the children of these people will 
doubtlessly create a problem that must be met in the near 
future. How tills problem will be m t should make an inter­
esting study for some one.
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